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Abstract: The paper analyses the construction of a more than favourable image of Eleftheri-
osVenizelos in Britain in 1915–1920. Although Venizelos was highly praised and popular 
in Britain since at least 1913, his effort to bring Greece to the side of the Entente in 1915 
made him exceptionally popular in Paris and particularly in London. Traditions of Brit-
ish philhellenism have been analysed, particularly the influence of two associations: the 
Hellenic Society founded in 1879 and, especially, the Anglo-Hellenic League established 
in 1913. The latter helped boost Venizelos’s image in Britain, but it also paved the way for 
Anglo-Hellenism, the belief of some influential Britons that the fate of modern Greece 
is inseparably linked with Britain. The Times leaders/editorials and key articles on Veni-
zelos in 1915–1920 have been analysed to demonstrate the level of support and admiration 
that Venizelos gradually attained. The role of Ronald Burrows and the group of experts 
around The New Europe is particularly analysed in terms of how the image of Venizelos 
and Venzelist Greece was constructed. The degree of admiration for Venizelos in Britain 
has been dealt with through a number of periodicals and newspapers published in Britain 
during the Great War and through Venizelos’s biographies published in Britain with an 
aim to show how he became a widely respected super-celebrity. The views of leading Brit-
ish statesmen and opinion makers also indicate a quite high degree of identification with 
both Venizelos and Greek war aims in Britain in 1915–1920. The climax and the collapse 
of Anglo-Hellenism in 1919–20 are analysed at the end of the paper. When Venizelos lost 
the elections of November 1920, Anglo-Hellenism disappeared as a relevant factor in Brit-
ish politics, journalism and diplomacy. 
Keywords: Eleftherios Venizelos, Ronald Burrows, Anglo-Hellenism, Anglo-Hellenic 
League, The Times
During the Great War the Kingdom of Greece was one of the small coun-tries for which the British public showed great enthusiasm, especially in 
the period of 1915–1920. This kind of sympathies did not characterise the pre-
ceding period in which philhellenes were many but unable to dominantly shape 
British public opinion.
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What was Greece’s image in Britain at the beginning of the twentieth 
century? There were many inﬂuential philhellenes in Britain on the eve of the 
First World War, gathered particularly around the Hellenic Society, but there 
was also an opposite trend, especially observable in the works of David George 
Hogarth. Arnold Toynbee came to believe, in 1912, in “the soundness of racial 
prejudice” and began to “religiously preach mishellenism” to any philhellene he 
came across, although his real aversion to modern Hellenism arose only in 1920.1 
Modern British philhellenism was at its peak in 1915–1920. What was 
peculiar about this phenomenon was that it did not come as a result of affection 
for a modern Greek writer or an artist, but for a politician. The politician was 
EleftheriosVenizelos. His political rise was meteoric. In August 1910, he entered 
the Hellenic Parliament, in October, he was prime minister of Greece. He im-
mediately enforced new elections and in December 1910 won a landslide victory 
having secured 307 out of 362 seats in the Hellenic Parliament, as head of a new 
party – the Liberal Party.2 From then on, he remained an unavoidable factor in 
Greek politics. He headed Hellenic governments six times (Oct. 1910 – Mar. 
1915; 23 Aug. – 5 Oct. 1915; June – 20 Nov. 1917; 24 Jan. – 19 Feb. 1924; July 
1928 – May 1932; and Jan. – Mar. 1933). 
Although he demonstrated no bellicose inclinations whatsoever on the 
eve of the Balkan Wars, once the Great War proved to be a world conﬂict Veni-
zelos looked for a chance to bring the Hellenic Kingdom into the war on the 
side of the Entente. This, naturally, made him popular in London and Paris. He 
had already been noticed and highly praised for his integrity during the London 
Conference of 1913. When the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in 
November 1914, the Entente was compelled to strike back by launching, in Feb-
ruary 1915, the Dardanelles Expedition. This encouraged Venizelos to attempt 
to bring Greece into the war. The opposition he met from King Constantine 
resulted in his resignation on 6 March 1915.3
In June 1915, however, Venizelos won the parliamentary election, taking 
184 out of 317 seats, and was back in power before the end of August. How 
good his reputation was in Britain at that time may be seen from the cartoon 
“The Return of Ulysses” published in the Punch of 23 June 1915 in which he was 
depicted as a new Odysseus. Upon Bulgaria’s entry into the war, Venizelos de-
1 Cited in Richard Clogg, “The British School at Athens and the Modern History of 
Greece”, Journal of Modern Hellenism 10 (1993), 95.
2 Helen Gardikas Katsiadakis, “Venizelos’s Advent in Greek Politics, 1909-1912”, in P. 
Kitromilides, ed., EleftheriosVenizelos: the Trials of Statesmanship (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2006), 99–100.
3 See Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 85; N. Petsalis Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference (1919) (Thes-
saloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1978), 34.
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cided that the 1913 Military Agreement with Serbia became enforceable. King 
Constantine, however, considered that Greece was under no obligation to Serbia 
since a world war was in progress, and the Agreement of 1913 could not have 
envisaged such a course of events. Faced with the resistance not only of the King 
but also of the General Staff, by early October Venizelos had decided to resign 
again, which caused dissatisfaction in the Entente camp. 
The most important consequence of the dispute between Venizelos and 
King Constantine was that the Allies accepted his suggestion to send in troops, 
and their disembarkation near Salonika began on 3 October 1915. That was the 
basis for the subsequent Salonika or Macedonian Front. 
Venizelos, British pro-Hellenic sentiments and the Anglo-Hellenic League
Pro-Hellenic societies had substantial pre-WW1 traditions in Britain. On 16 
June 1879, the Hellenic Society was formed at Freemason’s Tavern in London. 
It had 112 original members and additional fifty who joined at the found-
ing meeting. Although it was a society interested in Hellenic antiquities, it 
also promoted modern Greece. Among the Society’s five aims number 2 and 
3 were: “(2) To be a medium for the publication of Memoirs on all things 
Greek, both ancient and modern. (3) To promote the study of the ancient and 
modern Greek language and literature.”4 The first governing body of the So-
ciety elected in January 1880 included the Bishop of Durham as its president, 
the Earl of Morley, J. Gennadios and the Master of Trinity College among its 
vice-presidents. Among its Council’s members were a bishop, several clergy-
men and Oxbridge professors, four MPs, including A. J. Balfour, and Oscar 
Wilde.5 Among forty-three officers of the Society only one was ethnic Greek: 
J. Gennadios. The Society supported very much the establishment of the Brit-
ish School at Athens in 1886, and later. 
At least since the time of Byron there was a line in British public opinion 
that connected ancient with modern Hellenes, and the same was the case in 
other European countries. During the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s 
Western publics sympathised with the Greek rebels, and they were joined by 
1,100 foreign volunteers. Among them more than a hundred were Brits, and at 
least twenty-one of them lost their lives.6 Arnold Toynbee aptly summarised the 
connection of modern Western civilisation with ancient Hellas:
4 George A. MacMillan, “An Outline of the History of the Hellenic Society”, Part 1, Journal 
of Hellenic Studies 49/2 (1929), ii.
5 Ibid. iv.
6 William St. Clair, That Greece Might Still Be Free. The Philhellenes in the War of Inde-
pendence (London: OUP, 1972), 355–356.
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That portion of contemporary humanity which inhabits Western Europe and 
America constitutes a specific society, for which the most convenient name is 
‘Western Civilization’, and this society has a relationship with Ancient Greek 
society which other contemporary societies – for instance, those of Islam, India, 
and China – have not. It is its child.7   
This kind of perception was certainly not restricted to Britain. Cultural 
elites in other centres of Western civilisation (Munich, Vienna, Berlin, Paris 
or Washington) felt the same way since the age of Classicism. What gave ad-
ditional flavour to British identification with Hellas was the Oxbridge system 
of education with very developed classical studies and very wide knowledge of 
Homer, Thucydides and Plutarch among its students. To identify with modern 
Hellenism was therefore not theoretically too difficult. What prevented this to 
happen between the 1830s and 1880 was Britain’s Turkophile policy. Once it 
was abandoned, after Gladstone’s electoral victory in 1880, there was more un-
derstanding in Britain for Greece and other Balkan Christian states and increas-
ingly less for the Ottoman Empire. The very establishment of the Hellenic So-
ciety came just after the Agitation, a movement in British society that identified 
with the liberation of Balkan Christians and against the positions of the Disraeli 
government, which had been in office in 1876–1880.      
A part of the same stream was the Anglo-Hellenic League. In 1963, on the 
occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Anglo-Hellenic League, Sir Steven Run-
ciman properly echoed feelings of British philhellenes: “For many centuries, even 
before the days of Lord Byron, the British have felt a special sympathy and debt 
to Greece, the mother of our civilization and the inspiration of our poets.”8 The 
League was an important pro-Hellenic association which was to play a major role 
in the pro-Hellenic and pro-Venizelist propaganda efforts during the Great War. 
It was founded in 1913 in London. Its main initiator was Ronald M. Burrows 
(1867–1920), principal of King’s College London in 1913–1920. In this capacity 
Burrows “became powerhouse of academic propaganda in favour of national self-
determination for the peoples of Eastern Europe.”9 The League whose aim was 
to defend the “just claims and honour of Greece” assisted in boosting a wave of 
Hellenophilia that developed in Britain during the Great War. 
To change Greece’s image one needed to personalise it. Burrows and 
other British philhellenes found a hero symbolising both ancient Hellas and 
modern Greece who was suitable for being presented to the British public. He 
7 Arnold Toynbee, “History”, in R. W. Livingstone, ed., The Legacy of Greece (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1924), 289.
8 Sir Steven Runciman, “Foreword”, in Views of Greece by James Skene (London: Anglo-
Hellenic League, 1963), 3. In 1962 the League had about 500 members. 
9 Richard Clogg, “Politics and the Academy: Arnold Toynbee and the Koraes Chair”, Mid-
dle Eastern Studies 21/4 (Oct. 1985), 3.
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was EleftheriosVenizelos. His participation at the London Conference in 1913 
earned him a good reputation and provided him with the opportunity to estab-
lish good connections in Britain. His personality and diplomatic abilities were 
noticed both by British statesmen and by other Balkan politicians and diplo-
mats. Chedomille Miyatovich/Čedomilj Mijatović, who joined the Serbian del-
egation semiofficially, observed:
Of all the Balkan delegates, Greece’s first delegate, Mr. Venizelos, made the 
best impression in diplomatic circles and in London Society. He looked a born 
gentleman, of fine manners, consideration for others, dignified, yet natural and 
simple.10
Some British journalists were equally impressed: 
I recall that famous dinner given to the Balkan delegates in London in the 
midst of the First Balkan War when all our hopes were so high and I remember 
how the personality of the man [Venizelos] stood out from the commonplace 
figures of his colleagues.11
How high was Burrows’s esteem for Venizelos may be seen from his poem 
in 42 lines entitled “Song of the Hellenes to Veniselos the Cretan”, published in 
Manchester University Magazine in January 1913. The song was prompted by the 
First Balkan War, the liberation of Aegean Greek islands and the entry of Greek 
army into Salonika:
Veniselos, Veniselos,
Do not fail us! Do not fail us!
Now is come for thee the hour,
To show forth thy master power.
Lord of all Hellenic men,
Make our country great again.12
At the end of the song Burrows likened Venizelos to Pericles: 
Great in war and great in peace, 
Thou art second Perikles!13
The Anglo-Hellenic League was focused primarily on British Greeks. 
Ever since its inception in 1913, one of the leading things that the Anglo-Hel-
lenic League was doing was actually promoting Venizelos in Britain. Between 
1913 and the end of 1918 the Anglo-Hellenic League published 37 pamphlets 
10 Chedomille Mijatovich, The Memoirs of a Balkan Diplomatist (Cassel and Co., 1917), 
237.
11 A G. G., “M. Venizelos and his Conﬂict with the King”, The Daily News and Leader, 17 
Apr. 1915.
12 George Glasgow, Ronald Burrows: A Memoir (London: Nesbit & Co., 1924), 161.
13 Ibid. 162.
http://www.balcanica.rs
Balcanica XLIX (2018)130
and in most of them Venizelos was mentioned and celebrated and four of them 
were exclusively dedicated to Venizelos.14
The Anglo-Hellenic League defined its five aims in Article 3 of its rules:
1) To defend just claims and honour of Greece.
2) To remove existing prejudices and prevent future misunderstanding 
between the British and Hellenic races, as well as between the Hellenic 
and other races of South Eastern Europe.
3) To spread information concerning Greece and stimulate rest in Hel-
lenic matters.
4) To improve the social, educational, commercial and political relations 
of the two countries.
4) To promote travel in Greece and secure improved facilities for it.15 
Burrows offered the shortest possible definition of the League’s goals, call-
ing it  “a fighting society of keen friends of Greece” in a letter written in April 1919.16
A list of officers of the League from 1915 indicates that the patron of the 
League was Prince Nicholas of Greece, its chairman William Pember Reeves, 
director of the London School of Economics, and among members of the Ex-
ecutive Committee were, in addition to Reeves, Dr. Ronald Burrows, Principal 
of King’s College, and Prof. Gilbert Murray of the University of Oxford. In the 
very process of the League’s establishment main initiators were also two Anglo-
Hellenes, D. J. Cassavetti and A. C. Ionides. The League had a special branch in 
Athens, established in December 1914,17 and a Ladies Committee. The list of 
the League’s members published in 1915 takes up sixteen and a half pages con-
taining 613 names, including 36 life members who paid subscription for this dis-
tinction in the amount of 10 pounds.18 The next list published for 1916 covers 
577 members, including Arnold Toynbee.19 By the end of the war the number 
of members remained stable (580), with some new prominent members such as 
Sir Arthur Evans.20 
14 Pamphlets of the Anglo-Hellenic League: Pamphlet no. 19, “EleftheriosVenizelos and 
English Public Opinion” (1915), 29 p.; no. 28, “Speech of Mr. E. Venizelos to the people 
delivered in Athens on Sunday, August 27, 1915 [Greek and English]” (1916), 15 p.; no. 30, 
“Venizelos and his fellow countrymen, by P. N. Ure” (1917), 14+1 p.; and no. 35, “England’s 
Welcome to Venizelos” (1917), 20 p.
15 Rules of the Anglo-Hellenic League, 3. 
16 Quoted in Richard Clogg, “The ‘Ingenious Enthusiasm’ of Dr. Burrows and the ‘Unsati-
ated Hatred’ of Professor Toynbee’, Modern Greek Studies Yearbook IX (1993), 79.
17 Statutes of the Anglo-Hellenic League. Athens Branch, 1914.
18 The Anglo-Hellenic League. List of Members, 1915, 1–17. Rules of the Anglo-Hellenic 
League (s. l., s. a.), 7 p.
19 The Anglo-Hellenic League. List of Members, 1916, 1–16.
20 The Anglo-Hellenic League. List of Members, 1919, 1–18. 
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The League’s members were mostly British Greeks. Among 36 life mem-
bers in 1915 one finds the most prominent Greek families in the Isles including: 
Calvocoressi, Embricos, Eumorfopoulos, Ionides, Pallis and Ralli. Greeks from 
Greece accounted for only about two per cent of the membership. The fact that 
the League was very much an organisation of Greek diaspora in Britain was 
not something that boosted its influence. It, however, strengthened the claims 
that Greeks overwhelmingly supported Venizelos. If the most influential British 
Greeks supported overwhelmingly Venizelos, then the claim of Burrows and 
The Times that most of Greeks in Greece did the same persistently during the 
Great War seemed very plausible. The League served to support the rising star 
of Venizelos. But his star was not created by the League. It emerged as a senti-
mental response based on long traditions of classical scholarship in Britain, but 
also from the need to personalise the allies. 
Unavoidable British comparisons between the modern Greeks and the 
Hellenes did not always produce very favourable results for the former. Ancient 
Roman satirical writers produced a comic version of Greeks, the so-called grae-
culi (little Greeks), an image that was still in the air on the eve of the Great 
War and occasionally (mis)used by comparing the modern with the ancient 
Hellenes.21 Venizelos, however, could easily be imagined as a modern copy of 
Odysseus, and had a typically Hellenic beard known to British admirers of an-
tiquity from the busts of the Antonine era.  His manners and education were 
within the best standards of Victorian England and he himself displayed An-
glophile sentiments. Taken together his physical appearance, his way of conduct 
and manners, and his openly displayed Anglophilia, made an excellent combina-
tion for the creation of his public image in Britain. Through the activities of the 
Anglo-Hellenic League as a kind of his PR agency, his positive image was easily 
strengthened and disseminated in the British press.22 
The membership of the League was mostly Greek, but its British mem-
bers were quite influential and it was them that launched something that could 
be termed Anglo-Hellenism: the belief that the fate of modern Greece was in-
separably tied to England and that England had a mission to support the revival 
of modern Hellenism. During the Great War, when the activities of the League 
and of The New Europe magazine overlapped, Anglo-Hellenism influenced this 
21 See e.g. D. G. Hogarth, “The Eastern Mind“, The Monthly Review 15 (Apr. 1904), 113–
128. David G. Hogarth, A Wandering Scholar in the Levant (London: John Murray, 1896). 
In the latter text (p. 191) Hogarth compares the Greek Cypriots with the ancient Hellenes 
and finds them to be similar to graeculi who passed down “the road of racial decay these two 
thousand years.”
22 Slobodan G. Markovich, “Anglophiles in Balkan Christian States (1862–1920)”, Balcanica 
XL (2009), 127.
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weekly as well. This meant that several relevant opinion and even decision mak-
ers got imbued with the spirit of Anglo-Hellenism.
The Times on Venizelos
The leading British quality daily played a very important role in the establish-
ment of an excellent image of Venizelos in Britain. The Cretan had been known 
to the readers of The Times at least since 1901, when the newspaper began re-
porting on his Cretan activities. The Times Digital Archive records that by the 
end of June 1914 the London daily had mentioned him in at least 406 articles.23 
Between July 1914 and the end of 1918 Venizelos was mentioned in additional 
633 different articles in The Times. In terms of quality rather than quantity, he 
was mentioned twenty-nine times in leaders and editorials, all of which depicted 
him in superlatives in the period between March 1915, when he was mentioned 
for the first time in a leader during the Great War, and the end of the war, and in 
some twenty letters mostly written by members of the Anglo-Hellenic League, 
particularly by Burrows and Sir Arthur Evans.
As early as 1901 The Times mentioned Venizelos as “a man of remark-
able ability”.24 When in December 1910 he won elections for the Revisionary 
Chamber, J. D. Bourchier, correspondent of The Times, called him “master of the 
situation in Greece”, and noticed that he was welcomed “as the saviour, the regen-
erator of Greece, and has even been compared with the long expected Messiah”, 
concluding that a “gigantic task” was laid “before the Cretan Hercules”.25
23 Using four different spellings: usually Venezelos, less frequently Venizelos, three times 
as Venezelo, and only once as Veniselos. The numbers of articles mentioning Venizelos in 
The Times in the chart contain all four spellings. This number is not the same as the actual 
number of articles, which is higher. This is due to the system of optic character recognition 
which is still not fully efficient for articles from the nineteenth century and the first decades 
of the twentieth century. The same goes for the British Newspapers Archives. 
24 “Crete”, The Times, 5 Apr. 1901, p. 3 e.
25 “M. Venezelos” (From Our Correspondent in the Balkan Peninsula)”, The Times, 13 Dec. 
1910, 5.
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However, special interest in Venizelos developed, as the chart above sug-
gests, only in the winter of 1915, with the Dardanelles Expedition. Venizelos’s 
readiness to enter the war on the side of the Entente made him very popular 
in Britain. When he failed to do that, he resigned, and The Times was disap-
pointed at the downfall of “the great Minister who saved the country and the 
Monarchy five years ago”, but concluded: “all the news available tends to show 
that Mr. Venezelos will be supported by the whole force of national opinion.”26 
The question that then appeared was what his next move would be. In April, a 
leader in The Times encouraged his re-activation: “The character and the history 
of the only great statesman whom modern Greece has yet produced forbid us to 
imagine that he can prefer his own tranquillity and ease to the public good”, and 
expressed hopes that in the coming elections “the nation whom he has saved” 
would “reaffirm the confidence they showed him in the great constitutional crisis 
of 1910”.27 The previous analysis was confirmed by William Knight’s letter to 
the editor informing the readers that the late King of the Greeks George likened 
Venizelos to Pericles.28   
The Greek elections held in June 1915 were followed with huge attention. 
One should bear in mind that The Times had appreciation for King Constantine 
and just before elections it stated in its leader: “King Constantine, it need hardly 
be said, understands the duties and the position of a Constitutional Monarch 
in a highly democratic State too well not to bow to the considered will of the 
country.”29 When the news appeared that Venizelos won another landslide vic-
tory, satisfaction was openly displayed: “For Great Britain and her Allies the 
chief cause for satisfaction lies in the knowledge that the destinies of Hellenic 
people will again be controlled, in so far as any one man can control them, by 
an experienced patriot of proved ability and farsightedness.”30 He was called “a 
statesman with insight into the real issues of the European struggle”, as someone 
who will work for Greece “and for Europe”.31 
Venizelos took up the position of Prime Minister of Greece again in Au-
gust 1915. In early October a new conflict with King Constantine emerged. On 
4 October, Venizelos addressed the Hellenic Parliament and said that Greece 
might automatically implement the stipulations of its military alliance with 
Serbia from 1913 “without any necessity for waiting a declaration of war by 
26 “The Crisis in Greece”, The Times, 10 Mar. 1915, 11.
27 “M. Venezelos in Retirement”, The Times, 10 Apr. 1915, 9.
28 “M. Venezelos”, The Times, 13 Apr. 1915, 9.
29 “The Greek Elections”, The Times, 14 June 1915, 9.
30 “The Decision of Greece”, The Times, 17 June 1915, 9.
31 “M. Venezelos and his Rivals”, The Times, 22 June 1915, 9. 
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the Central Powers in accordance with the precedent set by Italy”.32 His pro-
Entente attitude encouraged France and Britain to begin the landing of Allied 
troops at Salonika, although Venizelos made a formal protest. His resignation 
on 6 October 1915 prompted the London daily to publish his character sketch 
of a man “of irresistible charm in conversation”. He “wielded a personal influence 
that went far to secure recognition for his high moral character and steadfast-
ness of purpose”. Yet, a man of such qualities was forced to resign, and The Times 
claimed in a rather worried tone that the sequel could show if his patriotic ef-
forts would “remain solely as an isolated episode to remind future generations of 
Hellenes what their country might have been”.33 
In early November The Times summarised the situation in Greece where 
King Constantine had “twice over baffled British diplomacy and compromised 
British military schemes”, and assessed it as notorious that “in Greece, as in oth-
er Balkan kingdoms, Governments depend more on the Sovereign than on the 
Parliament.”34 In December both King Constantine and Venizelos addressed 
the British public. On 5 December 1915, special correspondent of The Times 
had an audience with King Constantine who gave him an interview.35 Two days 
after the publication of the interview Venizelos also gave an interview to the 
same correspondent.36 Reaction of The Times, published at the same page with 
Venizelos’s reply, indicated that the Greek king was still held in esteem in Brit-
ain, and the British daily somewhat naively put a question: “If Sovereign and 
statesman can collaborate in contributing to our columns important declara-
tions upon the position and policy of their common country, is it too much to 
hope that they may even now find some way to work together for the welfare 
of the Hellenic cause, which we believe them, each in his separate way, to have 
equally at heart?”37
It became obvious very soon that there would be no joint policy of the 
Greek king and Venizelos. In April 1916, The Times mentioned “renewed activ-
ity of the Venizelists”.38 It also reported that the new organ of the Liberal Party 
Kirix reached “an unprecedented circulation for Athens”.39 The surrender of 
strategically important Fort Rupel to the Bulgarians on 26 May 1916 provoked 
32 “Allied Troops at Salonika”, The Times, 6 Oct. 1915, 9.
33 “M. Venezelos. A Character Sketch”, The Times, 7 Oct. 1915, 11.
34 “A Deplorable Ambiguity”, The Times,  4 Nov. 1915, 9.
35 “Attitude of Greece. The King on his Policy. Special statement to The Times”, The Times, 
7 Dec. 1915, 9.
36 “M. Venizelos. A reply to King Constantine”, The Times, 11 Dec. 1915, 9.
37 “King Constantine and M. Venizelos”, The Times, 11 Dec. 1915, 9.
38 “M. Venizelos’s Return to Public Life”, The Times, 21 Apr. 1916, 3.
39 “Late War News. A Venizelist Campaign”, The Times, 4 Apr. 1916, 7.
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the blockade of Greek ports by the Entente and the Greeks were warned: “Their 
friends in the West may only hope that they will weigh well the consequences of 
their decision before it is too late.”40 Relations to the King cooled in June when a 
“significant incident” was reported. On that occasion rioters in Athens attacked 
Venizelists and their newspapers and Greek secret police attacked an employee 
of the British Legation in Athens.41 
In late August 1916, The Times reported on “Great Athens Protest Meet-
ing” against the Bulgarian invasion, and it offered a chance to Venizelos to address 
the protesters and to repeat his pro-Entente positions and as it was reported his 
appearance provoked “a tremendous outburst of cheering.”42 Several days later 
correspondent of The Times for the Balkans expressed hopes that Romania’s 
entry into the war on the side of the Entente lent “confidence to the party of M. 
Venizelos”, and that it would “hasten the inevitable participation of that country 
in the war on the side of the Entente.”43 It is characteristic of Venizelos that just 
before leaving Athens with Admiral Condouriotis to lead the movement that 
would secure Greece’s alliance with Britain, France and other allies, he sent a 
special message to the British public through The Times. The newspaper called 
the message “a supreme appeal”. It was actually a statement written by Venizelos 
and given to “the well informed correspondent at Athens” who had already been 
known for his pro-Venizelist stance. In the statement he wrote:
It has long been known that my policy as head of the Liberal Party aimed at the 
intervention of Greece on the side of the Entente Powers against their attack-
ing enemies. I have always maintained that the interests and fortunes of Greece 
were dependent upon her traditional friendship with the Entente Powers.
Then he repeated the history of his efforts to bring Greece into the war, 
mentioned the betrayal of Kavala and the loss “of the greater part of Greek Mace-
donia”, and claimed that he urged the king to rescue his country and even offered 
to retire. Obviously aware of the deep distrust in Britain of antimonarchical and 
revolutionary movements, he insisted: “Do not think that I am heading a revolu-
tion in the ordinary sense of the word. The movement now beginning is in no 
way directed against the King or the Dynasty.” He tried to assure the British 
public that everything was to induce the King to “come forth as King of the Hel-
lenes” and, once he had done it, “all of us, shall be only too glad and ready at once 
to follow his Flag as loyal citizens…” At the end of the statement he revealed 
the real purpose of this “supreme appeal”: “I feel sure that we may count on the 
40 “The Bulgarians in Greece”, The Times, 30 May 1916, 7.
41 “A Significant Incident”, The Times, 16 June 1916, 9.
42 “King Constantine’s Policy. Great Athens Protest Meeting”, The Times, 30 Aug. 1916, 6.
43 From Our Correspondent in the Balkan Peninsula, “Nearing a Climax in the Balkans”, 
The Times, 5 Sep. 1916, 9.
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sympathy and good will of the free English people towards us in the mission we 
are setting out to accomplish.”44
The next day The Times published Reuter’s news from Canea (Chania) in 
Crete about the Proclamation of the Provisional Government by Venizelos and 
Condouriotis.45 Some ten days later G. Ward Price informed the readers of the 
leading London daily that Venizelos arrived in Salonika, that the crowd shouted 
“zito” (“long live”), and that “M. Venizelos was engulfed by his admiring fellow-
citizens directly he landed, and he was borne along in the heart of the jostling 
throng”.46 On 21 November, four weeks after the first message of Venizelos, The 
Times published another one in which it called the Greek statesman “leader of 
the National Defence movement”. In this second statement Venizelos thanked 
the Allies and expressed his “sincere gratitude to the Allied Press and peoples 
who have been so ready with their keen and sympathetic support of our national 
struggle”. Again he was careful not to make impression of any anti-dynastic pol-
icy. At the end of the letter he defined Greece’s national aims:
We wish to fight of our national interests side by side with our natural and tra-
ditional friends.  
We wish to make good, as far as we can, the harm that we did to heroic Serbia 
by the nonfulfillment of our obligations.
We wish finally to ensure in the future the right to be a free people, the masters 
of our own destinies.
In a word, we are struggling for precisely those principles, for the triumph of 
which over Prussian militarism the Allied Powers are waging their great war.
Venizelos’s message ended with an appeal to the great powers to grant 
Greece “that material and moral support of which we are in need to enable us to 
bring our struggle to a successful conclusion”.47
Britain and British opinion makers found themselves in an awkward po-
sition. Since March 1915 they had campaigned for Venizelos to be head of gov-
ernment, but of the government in Athens. Instead they got him as the head of a 
government in Salonika that gathered pro-Allied Greek officers and politicians, 
but who were all hostile to the official government in Athens, the only one in 
Greece that Britain officially recognised. This duality could not last long.    
On 1 and 2 December 1916, incidents with casualties took place in Ath-
ens when Allied troops disembarked upon the refusal of the Athens government 
to accept the ultimatum of French Admiral Dartige du Fournet. Even a century 
later it is not easy to know what exactly happened on the ground in central 
Athens. For the purposes of this text it is not of prime importance who deceived 
44 “M. Venizelos. Message to The Times. A Supreme Appeal”, The Times, 27 Sep. 1916, 9.
45 “Greek Provisional Government”, The Times, 29 Sep. 1916, 6.
46 G. Ward Price, “M. Venizelos’s Arrival at Salonika”, The Times, 11 Oct. 1916, 8.
47 “M. Venizelos”, The Times, 21 Nov. 1916, 9.
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whom and who provoked the shooting around the Zappeion. What is more 
important is how the events in Athens were perceived in the Entente capitals. 
The events of 1 and 2 December were described as “treacherous attacks made by 
King Constantine’s troops”.48 They were seen in such light by all the sections of 
British public opinion, “and the last vestiges of respect” for the Greek king were 
destroyed in London and Paris.49 The Times later summarised the events as they 
were seen in Britain: “Dec. 1, 1916. – Allied troops landed at Athens fired on by 
King Constantine’s troops; several killed. Reign of terror at Athens. Venizelists 
tortured.”50  
Burrows was very explicit after the events of 1 and 2 December, offering 
his answer to the question, “What should we do?” He demanded, first, that the 
Isthmus of Corinth be seized, second, that all of Greece north of the Pelopon-
nesus be evacuated by the Athens government, and third: “to recall Venizelos to 
Athens, with or without a Regency, and to acknowledge his government fully 
and absolutely as a Sovereign Power.”51
In December 1916 the friends of Hellas, in a letter to The Times, de-
manded action in favour of Venizelos, essentially the dethronement of King 
Constantine. Their letter appeared ten days after the formation of the new Brit-
ish government headed by David Lloyd George. It was signed by Lord Cromer 
and nine scholars, who apologised for not passing it on to be signed by other 
scholars due to the urgency of the situation. Among the signatories were Ronald 
Burrows, J. B. Burry, Arthur Evans and James Frazer. It starts in a sentimental 
vein: “We, whose love of Greece, is founded in gratitude for all that Europe owes 
to Greek literature, art, and history…” That lyrical introduction is followed by a 
clear political programme defined for Greece. To them, Venizelos “represents the 
views and wishes of a sound majority of the Greek people at home and abroad. 
We have therefore sympathised most keenly with him, as patriot and statesman, 
in his heroic endeavour to maintain the leadership, rightfully his, in face of a 
Court cabal… We feel the strongest indignation and disgust at the barbarity 
with which his followers have been maltreated.” Since the king and his advisors 
“have sinned beyond reparation… the Protecting Powers should take the one 
course which justice, honour, and prudence alike dictate, of insisting on such 
changes in the political arrangements of Greece as shall once more place the 
direction of affairs in the hands of M. Venizelos.”52 This was an appeal of cru-
cial importance. It was not Venizelos that demanded his own reinstatement or 
48 “Another Note to King Constantine”, The Times, 2 Jan. 1917, 9.
49 Alan Palmer, The Gardeners of Salonika (London: Andre Deutsch, 1965), 106.
50 “End of Greek Crisis”, The Times, 13 June 1917, 7. For a more balanced view see Palmer, 
Gardeners of Salonika, 104–107.
51 Ronald M. Burrows, “The Greek Rebuff ”, The Times, 4 Dec. 1916, 10.
52 Letter to the Editor, “M. Venizelos and Great Britain”, The Times, 16 Dec. 1916, 8 e.
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Constantine’s dethronement. Very respected Brits who enjoyed the reputation 
of regional experts asked for it. From that moment the removal of the Greek 
king was not a less than polite suggestion in Britain, but rather something that 
could be championed openly. 
 A de facto recognition of Venizelos’s provisional government by Lloyd 
George followed only three days later, and The Times leader was quick to sup-
port the prime minister emphasising that it was “the best step that could have 
been taken, and the one most closely in accordance with public feeling in this 
country”.53
 Prior to the recognition, Ronald Burrows acted as Venizelos’s public re-
lations officer. He persistently supplied the British press, particularly The Times, 
with details from the cables he received from Venizelos and was instrumental in 
creating the atmosphere in Britain that the situation in Greece was critical and 
that all pro-Entente action would be ruined unless the Allies took immediate ac-
tion in Greece on behalf of Venizelos. “Two cables have just reached me from M. 
Venizelos”, or “I had just had a cable from Mr. Venizelos” were typical phrases in 
Burrows’s letters and in that way he created the impression in the British public 
that he was the best informed person in the world on what was happening not 
only with Venizelos but with the whole Venizelist movement in Greece. As his 
biographer G. Glasgow noticed: “those cables were sent almost daily from the 
beginning of Venizelos’s revolutionary movement in 1915 till the settlement of 
the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres just before Burrows died.”54 
Unsurprisingly, when Venizelos’s Provisional Greek Government was 
established in Salonika, Burrows was asked to become a “semi-official repre-
sentative” of Venizelos in London, the “logical outcome of an already existing 
situation”.55 He indeed was an unofficial representative of Venizelist Greece in 
Britain from October 1915 until at least December 1916, when the official dip-
lomatic envoy of the Hellenic Kingdom in London, Joannes Gannadios, submit-
ted his resignation to join the Venizelist camp.56 
For Burrows the de facto recognition of the Provisional Government was 
only the beginning of his activities. He wanted to see Venizelos as prime min-
ister back in Athens already in his letter of 4 December 1916. In the spring of 
1917 he informed the British public about the activities of the royalist govern-
ment with a clear aim to encourage Britain to depose the king. On 5 May he 
53 Editorials, “The Allies and M. Venizelos”, 20 Dec. 1916, 9 b.
54 Glasgow, Ronald Burrows, 237. Burrows died in May 1920, a few months before the Trea-
ty of Sèvres was signed (10 August), but just after the San Remo conference in April 1920.
55 Clogg, “The ‘Ingenious Enthusiasm’ of Dr. Burrows”, 81; Glasgow, Ronald Burrows, 238. 
56 “M. Gennadius Resigns”, The Times, 5 Dec. 1916, 8. Cf. Donald M. Nicol, Joannes Gan-
nadios – The Man. A biographical sketch (Athens: American School of Classical Studies at 
Athens, 1990), 21–22.
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warned: “bands of irregulars, organized and financed by the Royalist Party, ter-
rorize Thessaly, and threaten our line of communication.” Therefore, he champi-
oned “a drastic solution of the Greek question”. He insisted: “Popular feeling in 
both England and France is overwhelmingly strong against the King. There is, 
indeed, no one living man who has done so much to check and thwart our plans.” 
He also urged that all twenty torpedo boats taken from the Athens government 
be given to Venizelos.57
Finally, Constantine fell in June 1917 and left Greece for Switzerland. The 
Times was happy to inform its readers in its editorial that the new king, Alex-
ander, Constantine’s son, was understood “to be free from the Potsdam concep-
tions of monarchy”. As far as the Protecting Powers (Britain, France and Russia) 
were concerned, The Times was confident that: “a statesman with a large views 
and the devoted patriotism of M. Venizelos will gladly work with them and with 
the new king for the unity and the liberty of the Greek nation.”58 When Veni-
zelos arrived in Athens, The Times enthusiastically reported on the impression 
he had made on his supporters. People of Piraeus came out into the streets to 
greet their leader and “scenes of almost religious enthusiasm which M. Venizelos 
always evokes were renewed”.59 
Lloyd George’s Hellenophilia and England’s welcome to Venizelos
Positions of Burrows and Venizelos were strengthened when a British Helleno-
phile, David Lloyd George, took the office of prime minister on 6 December 
1916. He remained in office until October 1922, throughout the period of cru-
cial events for Greece. Relations between the two statesmen had been estab-
lished during Venizelos’s first visit to Britain in December 1912, and they “served 
as the basis of his [Venizelos’s] policies for the next eight years”60. It has been 
assessed that Lloyd George’s “romantic radicalism had been fired by the image of 
Venizelos”.61 Good relations between the Welshman and the Greek culminated 
during the talks on Smyrna in 1919, when Lloyd George supported Greek and 
Venizelos’s aspirations.62 
57 Ronald M. Burrows, “The Situation in Greece”, The Times, 8 May 1917, 5.
58 “King Constantine’s Fall”, The Times, 14 June 1917, 7 a.
59 “M. Venizelos Acclaimed”, The Times, 25 June 1917, 6.
60 Michael Llewellyn Smith, “Venizelos’s Diplomacy, 1910–23: From Balkan Alliance to 
Greek-Turkish Settlement”, in Kitromilides, ed., Eleftherios Venizelos, 148.
61 Palmer, Gardeners of Salonika, 24. 
62 The two statesmen had dinner together on 19 May 1919. Frances Stevenson, Lloyd 
George’s personal secretary, noted: “The two have a great admiration for each other, and 
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One of the closest associates of Lloyd George was Sir Arthur Crosfield 
(1865–1938), a liberal MP. He was married to Domini (nee Elliadi/Iliadi), her-
self “a dear personal friend of Madame Veniselos.”63 When Arthur Crosfield was 
created a baronet in 1915, she became Lady Domini. She was known for enter-
taining the most prominent liberal politicians in her home.  
Lloyd George held Venizelos in high esteem and he expressed it on sev-
eral occasions. On 8 August 1917, at the meeting of the Serbian Society of Great 
Britain, Lloyd George greeted the prime minister of Serbia:
It is not without note that two of the greatest statesmen in Europe at the pres-
ent moment have been produced by two comparatively small nations of the 
East – M. Pashitch and M. Venizelos, to whose far-seeing patriotism we owe 
so much at the present moment and far more than it is possible for us even to 
reveal as to the prospects of the future. His steadfastness, his courage, and his 
insight have kept the soul of Greece alive under most trying conditions.64
Venizelos’s image in Britain saw a shiny moment during his visit to Lon-
don in November 1917. Two months earlier Punch had made a tribute to Veni-
zelos, portraying him and Kerensky as liberators in the style of Ex oriente lux. 
To a worried Kerensky, Venizelos said with determination: “Do not despair, I 
too went through sufferings, before achieving unity.”65 Venizelos was finally able 
to visit Britain in his capacity as prime minister of the country that joined the 
Entente powers. On 13 November 1917, he came from Paris with Lloyd George. 
There was no time to organise a public welcome, but The Times wanted to as-
sure him that “the people of this country think it no small thing to have him in 
their midst”, and that “in M. Venizelos they recognize a singleness of mind that 
appeals to their profoundest instincts”.66 The next day The Times published the 
Anglo-Hellenic League’s announcement of a public meeting to be held at Man-
sion House. It was topped by huge letters: “WELCOME TO VENIZELOS 
(Prime Minister of our Ally Greece).”67
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On 16 November 1917, the public meeting in Venizelos’s hon-
our took place in the Egyptian Hall of Mansion House. It was “crowded 
to the doors and hundreds of people were unable to enter”.68  The meet-
ing was organised under the auspices of the Anglo-Hellenic League. 
Apart from the lord mayor, it was attended by leading British politicians 
such as Arthur James Balfour (foreign minister), Lord Curzon and Winston 
Churchill (minister of munitions), by Mr and Mme Gennadius, Mr and Mme 
Burrows, and many other distinguished figures. At the beginning Ronald Bur-
rows read the message of the archbishop of Canterbury and then the lord mayor 
yielded the ﬂoor to A. J. Balfour:
Mr. Venizelos has now been travelling through Allied countries for some time. 
He has seen Rome, he has seen Paris, ha has finally come to London; and I do 
not think that in any Entente capital will he find a warmer welcome than he 
will find in the capital of the British Empire. [cheers.] And that is not merely 
because he has shown qualities greatly admired by our race – moderation, cour-
age, love of liberty – but also because he has, from the very beginning of these 
hostilities, seen with a sure and certain intuition that the cause of nationalities 
and the cause of international freedom lay in the keeping of the Entente Pow-
ers. [Cheers.]69 
Venizelos knew how to approach Britain’s highest classes and to win their 
hearts for the Greek cause. It can be seen from an excerpt from his speech:
What, therefore, I ask of you, the people of this great country, is not to judge 
the Greek nation as responsible for the personal policy of the dethroned 
king, nor to consider the violation of treaty with Serbia as reflecting upon us. 
[Cheers.] I can assure you that during that protracted and painful crisis, the 
great majority of the Greek people never approved of that treacherous policy. 
The good opinion of your great Empire is a precious asset for the Greek people. 
Ever since their resuscitation to a free political existence, the Greeks have 
looked for guidance to the great and splendid lessons which British political 
life offers. In it we have found harmoniously blended personal liberty with that 
order which ensures progress. All the public men of modern Greece, worthy of 
that name, have been unanimous in their belief that the edifice which has been 
reared by the genius of the British people, and which is known as the British 
Empire, or the British Commonwealth, is the grandest political creation in the 
life of man. [Cheers.]70
68 “London Welcome to M. Venizelos”, The Times, 17 Nov. 1917, 5.
69 AHL Pamphlet no. 35, England’s Welcome to Venizelos (London: the Anglo Hellenic 
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Opinions on Venizelos as statesman in the British public
In January 1915 Venizelos addressed two letters to King Constantine explain-
ing why Greece should join the Allies. Reactions in Britain were more than 
enthusiastic. Such eulogies were written on the Greek prime minister that the 
Anglo-Hellenic League felt it appropriate to issue a special publication titled 
EleftheriosVelizelos and English Public Opinion. The editors of this pamphlet were 
so overwhelmed by positive feelings about Venizelos in Britain that they wrote: 
The appreciation shown by the English Press for Greece’s great statesman has 
amounted to an outburst of admiration quite unusual in this country. It would 
not be easy to recall the name of any foreign statesman to whom such a tribute 
has been paid in England during his lifetime. A spontaneous and quite inde-
pendent display of respect so marked and unanimous is not to be passed over 
lightly, and must afford some consolation to the friends of M. Venizelos for the 
loss of his country and race caused by his withdrawal.71 
Naturally, when he was forced to resign the British press wrote very posi-
tive of him but expressed some doubts about modern Hellenes. A characteristic 
article was published in The Manchester Guardian: “Now the Greece of to-day 
owes more to M. Venizelos than to any single man, and if she cannot recognise 
her debt and her need and insist on his return to power no one from outside can 
help her.”72
When the Hellenic Kingdom failed to join the Entente Powers twice, 
in March and in October 1915, its image immediately deteriorated. The whole 
thing with the image of Greece in Britain was not merely geostrategic but also 
contained emotional overtones. As Ronald Burrows pointed out in 1916: “From 
the moment the war began, there was not a doubt in either country [France 
and Great Britain] that Greece was a friend, a good friend, and a brave friend… 
There was no question then in the Western mind of anyone in Greece being 
pro-German. Up to the beginning of 1915, there was no nation more trusted 
and believed in than Greece.”73 
Yet, there was one exception to this general trend. Venizelos’s efforts 
throughout 1915 to bring Greece into the war on the side of the Entente strength-
ened his good reputation in Britain. The following paragraph is characteristic:
For Greece knows that in him she has touched greatness, and that through him 
she has caught a vision of a nobler destiny than has been hers since the Turk 
brought his blight upon the Balkans. Venizelos is for the Allies for no mean 
71 AHL Pamphlet no. 19, EleftheriosVenizelos and English Public Opinion (London: The 
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thing. He is for them because he knows that with all their deficiencies they 
stand for freedom, for the moral law in the world against the law of Krupps 
and that in their triumph is the hope of liberty, of democracy and of the small 
nationality all over the world.74
By the time of his parliamentary victory in 1915 Venizelos had become so 
popular in Britain that journalists began a search for his noble ancestors, tracing 
his origin back to the famous fifteenth-century family of Benizeloi (Venizeli).75 
When he took the office of prime minister, the British press was even more 
sympathetic. The periodical World reminded its readers that it had described 
Venizelos as “one of the most striking personalities among European statesmen” 
on the occasion of his visit to London in January 1914. In August 1915, it went 
even further: 
No one, however, then thought that all Europe would be watching with painful 
anxiety the line of policy he might elect to pursue in the course of a great inter-
national struggle. Eighteen months ago, therefore, he was a celebrity; now he is 
almost a super-celebrity.76 
When he established the provisional government in October 1916, 
the mood was revived, and this was very much supported again by Ron-
ald Burrows. He praised Venizelos in several articles and championed him 
through his many and inﬂuential private contacts and in frequent letters to 
all major London dailies, The Times in particular. Many others soon followed 
suite. Burrows, of course, had paved the way, writing as early as May 1915: 
The one thing that can be said with certainty is that in the eyes of Europe Veni-
zelos is the greatest asset Greece has possessed since she became a kingdom, 
and that it will be many years before his successors win, as he has done, the im-
plicit confidence of the statesmen and the people of England and France.77
To Britain’s monarchist public, however, the legitimate government was 
in Athens as long as there was a legitimate king in the Hellenic capital, and 
they naturally tended to assume the subjects’ loyalty to their sovereign. Only 
one day before Venizelos was forced to submit his second resignation to the 
King, Crawfurd Price, expecting that Greece was just about to enter the war on 
the side of the Entente, wrote in The Pall Mall Gazette: “There are a great many 
writers in England today who owe a profound apology to King Constantine of 
Greece. No personality has been more persistently maligned and misrepresent-
74 A G. G., “M. Venizelos and his Conﬂict with the King”.
75 A letter signed by “A Greek” as a reaction to the previous text of Guardian’s correspond-
ent, The Manchester Guardian, 21 June 1915.
76 “Celebrities at Home”, The World no. 1787, 24 Aug. 1915.
77 Ronald M. Burrows, “Venizelos and the Greek Crisis”, The Contemporary Review (May 
1915), 552.
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ed in this country throughout the duration of the war.”78 He repeated similar 
points in mid-November.79 Crawfurd Price was one of the British journalists 
who changed sides in line with official British policy. Once a champion of King 
Constantine, he completed a book on Venizelos in November 1916 and called 
for Allied action in support of Venizelos:
If we are sincere in our devotion to the cause of freedom, justice and righteous-
ness, then this Venizelist movement is one which ought to receive our unstained 
support and full official acknowledgment. If we are determined in our intention 
to crush militarism in Europe, then it is illogical to us to support any offshoot 
of it in the Balkans.80
The very existence of a royal government reluctant to take any decisive 
step towards Greek participation in the war produced in some sections of Brit-
ish public opinion an unfavourable image of the Greeks as a nation,81 which not 
even Venizelos’s arrival in Athens to take the office of prime minister of a unified 
Hellas could change. Burrows criticised some British journalists:
No Philhellene can fairly complain of the attitude of the English Press as a 
whole. There has been a tendency, however, natural enough, to throw Venizelos 
into high relief by contrasting him with his fellow countrymen. It is a left-hand-
ed compliment to one who is Greek of the Greeks, and, above all men, stands 
for the solidarity of the race. So able a war correspondent as Mr. Ward Price 
found nothing in the welcome given to the Allied troops by the population of 
Thessaly, but a proof that ‘the Greek mind has little consistency, and no shame 
at suddenly renouncing one allegiance to embark on the opposite’.
Burrows was just as displeased with the Daily Chronicle’s interpretation 
of the shift of allegiance from King Constantine to Venizelos as a develop-
ment that “does not impress one with the strength of Hellenic character. The 
nation … has shown, on the whole, more resemblance to the Greeks of Juve-
78 Crawfurd Price, “Why Greece Held Back. King Constantine’s Answer to the Kaiser”, The 
Pall Mall Gazette, 4 Oct. 1915.
79 “King Constantine was not pro-German; he was before everything pro-Greek. His failure 
to agree with M. Venizelos was due to the fact that King Constantine is a military man, able 
to appreciate the situation, while the former is a politician.” “Greek King not pro-German”, 
The Evening Standard, 15 Nov. 1915.
80 Crawfurd Price, Venizelos and the War. A Sketch of Personalities & Politics (London: 
Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co. Ltd, 1917), 9.
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nal than to those of Pericles!”82 The same ambiguous attitude can also be seen 
from an article of the famous anthropologist Sir James George Frazer, who de-
scribed the anathema on Venizelos by the archbishop of Athens as a “barbarous 
ritual” common to “savages all over the world”.83 This article was intended to 
portray monarchists in the most unsympathetic way, but it did not help the im-
age of Greeks.  
Another important element in pro-Hellenic, pro-Czech and pro-Serbian 
propaganda was the launching in 1916 of the journal The New Europe by R. W. 
Seton Watson, Ronald Burrows, T. Masaryk and two inﬂuential journalists of 
The Times, Henry Wickham-Steed and Harold Williams.84 It supported the 
cause of small nations in Europe and, in the Balkans, the war efforts of the King-
dom of Serbia and Venizelist Greece. A. W. A. Leeper wrote, in November 1916, 
an Allied portrait of Venizelos for The New Europe, describing him as “the man 
who was to prove the most stalwart opponent to Prussianism in S. E. Europe”, 
and “in truth, a prophet”.85 In December Leeper warned about “the growth of 
anti-Venizelism” in Greece, denouncing the Athens government: “There can be 
no further compromise with such a Government.”86
Leeper’s opinion carried additional weight since he was placed in charge 
of the Balkans in the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Information. 
He also wrote for The New Europe under the pseudonym “Belisarius”, mostly 
on Bulgaria. Since May 1917 R. W. Seton-Watson and Lewis Namier were in 
charge of Central and Eastern Europe in the same department.87 In that way 
contributors to The New Europe got a special role in shaping public opinion in 
Britain, particularly the opinion of decision makers. Not infrequently, however, 
their points favoured the small nationalities of Central and South-East Europe, 
including Greeks and Serbs, much more than the Foreign Office was in a posi-
tion to accept.
Harold Nicolson, explaining later what contributors to The New Europe 
had in mind when promoting small nationalities, admitted that he himself “was 
overwhelmingly imbued” with the ideas of this journal. Old European states 
seemed obsolete concepts, new small nationalities were concepts that their emo-
tions were centred on. Speaking of the peacemakers of the Paris Peace Confer-
82 Ronald M. Burrows, “Venizelos in Athens”, The New Europe, 5 July 1917, 373.
83 Sir J. G. Frazer, “The Cursing of Venizelos”, The New Europe no. 19, 22 Feb. 1917, 174.
84 Glasgow, Ronald Burrows, 198–199.
85 A. W. E. Leeper, “Allied Portrait: (I) EleftheriosVenizelos”, The New Europe no. 6, 23 
Nov. 1916, 183, 186.
86 A. W. E. Leeper, “The Growth of Anti-Venizelism”, The New Europe no. 10, 21 Dec. 1916, 
314.
87 Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, The Making of a New Europe. R. W. Seton-Wat-
son and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary (London: Methuen, 1981), 207.
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ence he remarked “that the concepts ‘Germany,’ ‘Austria,’ ‘Hungary,’ ‘Bulgaria,’ or 
‘Turkey’ were not in the forefront” of their minds. “It was the thought of the 
new Serbia, the new Greece, the new Bohemia, the new Poland which made our 
hearts sing hymns at heaven’s gate.” He admitted that among the writers of The 
New Europe “bias there was, and prejudice”, but added: “But they proceeded, not 
from any revengeful desire to subjugate and penalise our late enemies, but from 
a fervent aspiration to create and fortify the new nations, whom we regarded, 
with maternal instinct, as the justification of our sufferings and of our victory.”88
The British Newspaper Archive digitises British historical newspa-
pers and makes them available online. Throughout the 2010s its content grew 
monthly. The chart below shows the number of articles available at the end of 
2017 in which Venizelos was mentioned. This rather incomplete list indicates 
that Venizelos was mentioned in nearly 13,000 British newspaper articles in the 
period 1914–1918. Only if one reads at least a few hundred of virtually thou-
sands of articles on Venizelos published in the British press of 1915–1920 can 
one gain some insight into the admiration showered on him by the British press 
in that period.  
One can only offer a selection of characteristic comments about Veni-
zelos, and an article in The War Budget collected several of them:
“The greatest living statesman in Europe” is a colossal claim to make for a man 
who was almost unknown out of his own country a few years ago. But the claim 
has been made for EleftheriosVenezelos by a far-sighted English journalist, who 
has seen and tested samples of all the diplomatic schools.
Another writer, who knows this man even more intimately, says that no other 
single character has inspired so many of the events which have been written 
permanently in the history of modern Greece as has M. Venezelos, who first 
88 Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking (London: Methuen, 1964), 32–33.
http://www.balcanica.rs
S. G. Markovich, EleftheriosVenizelos and British Public Opinion 147
planned and then strove with zealous patriotism and most remarkable ability to 
carry them through. 
He is a quiet, reserved, dignified lawyer, who hates war and despises the petty 
politics beloved of the modern Greek. But as a patriot he has few equals, and 
certainly no superior in any hand. 
Another great title earned unconsciously by this unassuming loyalist is “the 
Man of the Twentieth Century,” a title that sounds too big for any mortal mix-
ture of earth’s mould to wear. 89
As has already been mentioned, the Anglo-Hellenic League did its best 
to promote Venizelos. The League’s annual meetings could not go without ex-
pressions of admiration for Venizelos, often pronounced by very prominent 
Brits. In July 1918 the main speaker was Gilbert Murray, Regius Professor of 
Greek at the University of Oxford. His speech was reproduced in the League’s 
last wartime pamphlet. He could not fail to mention the Hellenic prime minis-
ter, likening him to Themistocles:
It is a remarkable thing and curiously characteristic if other points about 
Greece that at this moment, when on the whole European statesmanship has 
not shown very brilliantly… that at a time like that such a small State as Greece 
should have a statesman quite obviously of the first rank, a statesman whom 
the greatest Nations in the world would be proud to possess as a leader. [Hear, 
Hear.] It reminds one of the story of Themistocles, that for the really great 
career of a statesman you want both the great man and the great nation. It is a 
hard thing when the great man has not a corresponding strength and extent of 
territory behind him.90
In April 1920, Bonar Law, the leader of the Conservative Party at the 
time, echoed the opinion about Venizelos created among British politicians dur-
ing the Great War when he said in the House of Commons: “No single states-
man has supported the Allied cause through good report and ill so strongly as 
M. Venizelos.”91
Venizelos was so popular in Britain that the other Balkan statesmen who 
wrote their recollections at the time his popularity was at its peak found it ap-
propriate to include a chapter of admiration devoted to him. Thus, Take Jones-
cu, a leading Anglophile among Romanian politicians during the Great War and 
Venizelos’s personal friend, thought that the Greek statesman was very much 
89 “Venezelos the Statesman. A Prophet in the Mantle of the Great Athenians”, The War 
Budget, 12 Oct. 1916.
90 AHL pamphlet no. 37, “Annual General Meeting of the Anglo-Hellenic League, Thurs-
day, 11 July 1918. Address of Gilbert Murray, Regius Professor of Greek in the University of 
Oxford...” (1918), 15.
91 S. B. Chester, Life of Venizelos (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1921), 202.
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like Shakespeare, and considered him “a true example of human greatness, and 
of a greatness such that one may unreservedly admire it”.92
British biographies of Venizelos and a novel 
Within a span of only six years during and immediately after the First World 
War, 1915–1921, four biographies of Venizelos appeared in Britain, an unprec-
edented gesture of honour not only to a Hellenic statesman but to any Balkan 
statesman of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
The first biography, from the pen of C. Keroflas, was completed in Greek 
in August 1915 and then translated into English. Keroflas’s sympathies for Veni-
zelos were more than open, as shown by his preface: “Carlyle would assuredly 
have included him among his ‘Heroes’,” since he is a man “who, finding his coun-
try in the throes of a military revolution, restored it and raised it to the highest 
triumphs of victory.”93 Take Jonesco’s admiration for Venizelos was shown in his 
foreword to the book. The Morning Post commented: “It is, indeed, one of the ro-
mances of history that the Near East should have produced such a man,” and ex-
pressed regret that England did not have a man of such quality: “…What would 
we not give in England for a statesman who could tell his fellow-countrymen the 
truth and the whole truth and be prepared to lay down power without regret.”94
Venizelos even became the model for a character of a book of adventure 
fiction. In October 1915 the writer and politician John Buchan, who wrote war 
propaganda pieces during the Great War, published his novel The Thirty-nine 
Steps. The hero of the novel, Richard Hannay, feels “almost debilitating spleen 
and like Byron, contemplates a cure in the Balkans”.95 Hannay read in news-
papers about the Greek Premier Constantine Karolides, his incarnation of 
Venizelos. Karolides “played a straight game too, which was more than could 
be said for most of them. I gather that they hated him pretty blackly in Berlin 
and Vienna, but that we were going to stick by him, and one paper said that he 
was the only barrier between Europe and Armageddon”.96 The novel is about a 
German-sponsored conspiracy to assassinate Karolides. In the last months of 
1915 alone the novel sold 25,000 copies.97 Given the wide coverage of Venizelos 
92 Take Jonescu, Some Personal Impressions (London: Nisbet and Co. Ltd, 1919), 239–240.
93 Dr. C. Keroflas, Eleftheriois Venizelos. His Life and Work, transl. by Beatrice Barstow 
(London: John Murray 1915), xv.
94 “Venizelos. (Published to-day)”, The Morning Post, 15 Oct. 1915.
95 Vesna Goldsworthy, Inventing Ruritania. The Imperialism of the Imagination (New Ha-
ven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), 88.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid. 89.
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in the British press of that time, the readers could have hardly failed to grasp 
whom Buchan used as a model for Karolides. The novel confirms the assessment 
of The World that by August 1915 Venizelos became “almost a super-celebrity” 
in Britain.
The second biography, from the pen of Crawfurd Price, a strongly pro-
Hellenic and pro-Serbian British journalist, was completed in mid-November 
1916. Its publication in January 1917 took place at the time when the national 
schism in Greece was at its height but with Crawfurd Price who changed sides 
and became a supporter of Venizelos. Inspired by Venizelos’s departure from 
Crete to Salonika, it was an attempt to strengthen pro-Venizelist feelings in 
Britain. In conclusion to his preface Price noted: “If we are sincere in our de-
votion to the causes of freedom, justice and righteousness, then this Venizelist 
movement is one which ought to receive our unstinted support and full official 
acknowledgement.”98   
The other two biographies, published shortly after the First World War, 
were written by Vincent J. Seligman and S. B. Chester. Seligman’s biography was 
intended as a study of Greek politics from 1910 to 1918, and it is a clear eulogy of 
Venizelos. In his dedication of the book to EleftheriosVenizelos Seligman stated 
that it was meant as “a small tribute of the author’s respect and admiration”.99 
Finally, Chester’s book was published after Venizelos had lost his pre-
miership. It is prefaced by his hero’s letter and its last paragraph also includes a 
reference to Carlyle: 
Napoleon thought that in a country of large population a man would always be 
found to meet any national emergency. Since 1914 all the principal nations have 
been passing through a series of upheavals, but few leaders have come to light, 
either in the council chamber or in the field, for posterity to rank with the great. 
In Venizelos the Greeks had at their head one who has given new colour to the 
principle de la carrière ouverte aux talents, or, as Carlyle paraphrased it, “the tools 
to him who can wield them.”100
It speaks a lot about Venizelos’s ability to understand the importance of 
public relations that he found time to discuss issues of his life with his biogra-
phers who were all naturally very thankful to him for that.  
98 Price, Venizelos and the War, 9.
99 Vincent J. Seligman, The Victory of Venizelos. A Study of Greek Politics, 1910–1918 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1920), 5.
100 S. B. Chester, Life of Venizelos (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1921), 321. One should 
also add a very sympathetic American biography of Venizelos by Herbert Adams Gibbons, 
Venizelos (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1920).
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Anglo-Hellenism on trial in 1920
British sympathies for Venizelos and the Hellenic Kingdom were particularly 
helpful during the negotiations in Paris in 1919. At the negotiations the Greek 
statesman “emerged as one of the giants of the Conference”.101 It was at the very 
end of the Great War that philhellenic sentiments of some British diplomats 
mattered. This Anglo-Hellenism was felt in the new Political Intelligence De-
partment (PID), established in March 1918. It included Sir Eyre Crowe, Allen 
Leeper, Harold Nicolson and also, at that stage, Arnold Toynbee. Their goals in 
the Eastern Mediterranean seemed to correspond with those of Venizelos; in 
other words, the establishment of a Greece of two continents and five seas. The 
PID team was of crucial importance during peace negotiations in Paris in 1919. 
Needless to say, Leeper, Nicolson and Toynbee were all affiliated with Seton-
Watson’s New Europe. The philhellenes reverted to the British Turkophobia of 
the age of Gladstone, which developed in the 1880s, was the dominant force 
in British foreign policy until 1908 and was only paused in 1908–1912 when 
Britain supported the Ottoman governments after the Young Turks took power. 
As in London in 1913, so in Paris in 1919 Venizelos was again the star 
of the conference. He presented Greek claims on 3 February 1919, and his pre-
sentation was received so well that Allen Leeper remarked: “We all thought it 
was the most brilliant thing we’ve ever heard, such amazing strength and tactful-
ness combined.”102 In Paris British delegates sometimes acted almost as direct 
representatives of Venizelos and in championing Hellenic aims clashed with 
Italy and, to their surprise, they came quite frequently into direct collision with 
American delegates. However, the main supporter of Greek claims was British 
Prime Minister Lloyd George or, as Llewellyn Smith, put it: “The Lloyd George 
factor was crucial in assigning to Greece the mandate to occupy Smyrna.”103 
Greek troops began the occupation of Smyrna on 15 May 1919, and that was the 
climax of Venizelos’s foreign policy. The Treaty of Sèvres gave Greece almost all 
of Thrace including the whole Gallipoli Peninsula, the Aegean islands including 
Imbros and Tenedos, and a mandate over the zone of Smyrna, Tireh, Odemish, 
Magnisa, Akhissar, Berghama and Aivali. It was stipulated that this zone could 
become Greek after a five-year period. The Dodecanese, with the exception of 
Rhodes, were transferred by Italy to Greece.104
Harold Nicolson wrote an early analysis of how peacemaking was con-
ducted in Paris in 1919. It was unavoidable that he should mention Venizelos, 
101 Eric Goldstein, “Great Britain and Greater Greece 1917–1920”, The Historical Journal 
32/2 (1989), 344.
102 Quoted in Goldstein, “Great Britain and Greater Greece”, 345. 
103 M. Llewellyn Smith, “Venizelos’s Diplomacy”, 161.
104 Chester, Life of Venizelos, 319–320.
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whose diplomatic abilities were usually cited as something that contributed very 
much to the success of the Greek delegation in Paris. Nicolson believed that 
there was objectivity in decision making in Paris, but had to acknowledge Veni-
zelos’s special qualities. “Far be it from me to diminish in anyway the legend of 
M. Venizelos’ consummate mastery of diplomatic technique, or in any way to 
underestimate the triumph which the personal magnetism of that statesman 
achieved.” Comparing him with Romanian Prime Minister Bratianu, who had 
all the qualities opposite to Venizelos, Nicolson used the example of Roma-
nia to claim that the decisions of the Supreme Council were made “on wholly 
impersonal grounds”.105 Bearing in mind the special affection of Lloyd George 
and some other Brits imbued with Anglo-Hellenism for Venizelos and Greece, 
Nicolson’s claim does not seem justified. It should be noted that The Times obit-
uary of Venizelos called him “a dominant figure” of the Paris Peace Conference, 
and added: “it sometimes seemed that his personal influence was such that he 
had but to ask and all would be given to him.”106 
It was widely expected that after such diplomatic performance of Britain 
on behalf of Venizelos the Greek statesman would remain a hero of the Greek 
masses and that he would rule for many years enabling Britain to exert a strong 
influence in the Eastern Mediterranean with Venizelist Greece as her strategic 
and chief ally. Venizelos’s victory in the 1920 election was taken for granted. 
The fact was overlooked that he was absent from Greek politics for too long 
from the end of 1918 until the Treaty of Sèvres was finally signed in August 
1920, and that the mobilisation of Greeks for various military operations was 
not very popular. Also conducive to Venizelos’s defeat were the assassination of 
Ion Dragoumis by Venizelists on 13 August and the death of King Alexander 
on 25 October 1920.107 
The news of Venizelos’s electoral defeat on 14 November 1920 caused 
shock and disappointment both in London and in Paris, and was even seen as 
offensive. The Liberal Party won only 118 out of 369 seats in the Hellenic Par-
liament.108 The Times in its leader claimed: “We cannot recall since the days of 
Aristides a more signal example of popular ingratitude or a popular folly.” The 
London daily believed that the Greek voters had had a clear choice between two 
men of opposite qualities. Venizelos – “the man who saved nation, dynasty, and 
army in 1910”, “the enlightened champion of constitutional freedom at home 
and of the principles of the Allies and Associates abroad” – was the one they 
rejected. Instead, they chose the ex-King, “whose long continued treachery and 
105 Nicolson, Peacemaking, 136–137.
106 “Venizelos”, The Times, 19 Mar. 1936, 19.
107 Thanos Veremis and Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Protagonist in Politics, 1912–20”, in 
Kitromilides, ed., EleftheriosVenizelos, 129–130.
108 Ibid. 130–131.
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flagrant disregard of the Constitution… compelled the Allies to insist upon his 
resignation”. 
The message of The Times to the Greek electoral majority was more than 
clear. The Allies “did not sanction the creation of a Greater Greece for a benefit 
of a brother-in-law or a nephew of the ex-Keiser.” It was openly admitted: “The 
confidence of the Allies has received a rude shock. They were quite unprepared 
for such an exhibition of unsteadfastness, unwisdom and ingratitude.” A clear 
warning was sent to the Greeks: “If the Greeks ratify the course they have cho-
sen at the polls, they must take the consequence on their own shoulders.”109  
As has already been observed, “Venizelos’s guiding principle was to asso-
ciate Britain with his main goals”.110 Similarly, Britain associated her goals in the 
eastern Mediterranean with Venizelos’s expected long tenure as prime minister 
of Greece. His electoral defeat therefore signalled the end of Britain’s staunch 
commitment to a Greater Greece.111 Once the new Odysseus, Pericles and The-
mistocles was no longer prime minister of Hellas, British regional plans which 
counted on new Greece as a key ally in the eastern Mediterranean collapsed. 
Both Britain and Venizelist Greece won twice in 1918–20: on the battle-
field and at the end of the Great War, at the Paris Peace Conference. But in 
1920–22 they both were defeated in their aspirations in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean. In the early 1920s Britain had to face the following situation in the Balkans 
and its vicinity: 1) the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the creation of 
which Britain had very much helped at the end of the war, was abandoned to 
the French sphere of influence; 2) a disillusioned Bulgaria saw the results of the 
peace treaties as the final abandonment of the Gladstonian admiration for Bul-
garians and therefore could not look at Britain in a friendly way; 3) an offended 
and nationalistic Turkish Republic emerged and its creation was undermined 
by Britain in every possible way; and 4) the country that was supposed to be 
the British main regional ally, Venezelist Greece, found itself heavily defeated by 
Turkey, abandoned by Britain, with its pro-British liberals now in the Opposi-
tion, and with the British new Odysseus, Venizelos, in exile in 1920–22.
Ronald Burrows died on 14 May 1920. The Times titled his obituary 
quite appropriately “a champion of Greece”.112 By the end of the same year Veni-
zelos would leave Greece. Thus, in 1920 the great British enthusiasm for modern 
Hellenism suffered two major blows. Anglo-Hellenism, so prominent among 
British intellectuals, journalists, diplomats and politicians in 1916–1920, sud-
denly evaporated, and the strong and prominent interest in the fate of mod-
109 “The Greek Elections”, The Times, 17 Nov. 1920, 13.
110 Robert Holland and Diana Markides, The British and the Hellenes. Struggles for Mas-
tery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850–1960 (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 180.
111 Cf. Goldstein, “Great Britain and Greater Greece”, 356.
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ern Hellenism displayed in Britain during the Great War and its immediate 
aftermath was eclipsed by other domestic and foreign issues. That interest was 
concentrated on the person of Venizelos, and without the main protagonist in 
command it disappeared even quicker than it had emerged.  
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